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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
CONSTITUTIONAL LA W:-Equal Protection-Property 
Ownership Qualifications on the Right To Vote 
in Special Municipal Elections-Cipriano 
v. City of Houma* 
Plaintiff, a resident of Houma, Louisiana, who owned no real 
property, brought a class action seeking to prevent the city from 
issuing utility revenue bonds approved by a vote of the property 
taxpayers at a special election. He argued that the Louisiana statute1 
restricting the right to vote in such elections to property owners2 
was unconstitutional. Plantiff relied on Harper v. Virginia Board of 
Elections,3 in which the Supreme Court declared that Virginia's re-
quired payment of poll taxes for voting in general elections was a 
violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. Harper, he claimed, established that any voter qualification 
based on property ownership violates the equal protection clause. 
The three-judge federal district court rejected this argument, one 
judge dissenting; held, the denial to residents who do not own 
property of the right to vote in municipal elections on the issuance 
of revenue bonds for public utilities does not violate the equal pro-
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 
In general, ·there appear to be two types of limitations on the 
right to vote that are constitutionally permissible. Voter-qualifica-
tion requirements may be sustained either when they promote in-
telligent or responsible voting4 (voting competence) or when they 
• 286 F. Supp. 823 (E.D. La. 1968). This case was reversed by the Supreme Court in 
a unanimous decision on June 16, 1969 while this issue was in the final stage of being 
printed. N.Y. Times, June 17, 1969, at 57, col. 5. 
1. LA. REv. STAT. § 33:4258 (1950), pursuant to LA. CONST. art. 14, § 14(a). In the 
case of utility revenue bonds, LA. CONST. art. 14, § 14(m) contemplates an optional 
election, but the section first mentioned above makes it mandatory. If the voters in 
the special election veto the bond issue, that veto is decisive. If they approve it, final 
approval must still be given by the local governing body. LA. REV. STAT. §§ 33:4252, 
33:4258 (1950). Only the constitutionality of the distinction between property owners 
and nonproperty owners will be examined here; it should be noted, however, that the 
Louisiana statutes cited require that bond issues be authorized by a majority of the 
property taxpayers in "number and amount"-a requirement of doubtful constitu-
tionality in light of the development of, and emphasis on, one man-one vote. 
2. The property taxpayer requirement has been interpreted as a property ownership 
requirement. McFatter v. Beauregard Parish School Bd., 211 La. 443, 30 S.2d 197 
(1947); C. ADRIAN & C. PRESS, GOVERNING URBAN AMERICA 90 (3d ed. 1968) ("By 
property taxpayers are meant property owners, of course"). 
3. 383 U.S. 663 (1966). 
4. In Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 51 (1959), the 
Court upheld North Carolina's literacy requirement, concluding that "[t]he ability to 
read and write has some relation to standards designed to promote the intelligent use 
of the ballot." Other qualifications the Court there cited as constitutionally permissible 
were age, re.-;idence, and previous criminal record. 
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serve to separate persons with a substantial interest in the outcome 
of an election from others with little or no such interest5 (interest 
in the result). If the property ownership qualification in Cipriano 
performs either of these functions, the decision of the district court 
should be upheld. 
Qualifications for voting are traditionally established by the 
legislature, and thus it might seem that the legislative determina-
tion on the questions of voting competence and interest in the 
election should prevail. A strong presumption of validity normally 
attaches to legislative enactments,6 and consequently it is not the 
function of the judiciary to decide whether the means adopted by 
the legislature are the best means possible to attain the end sought.7 
Indeed, the court in Cipriano relied heavily on the legislature's 
There is some indication that restrictions on the states may be even more stringent 
when a congressional enactment is involved than when the fourteenth amendment alone 
is involved. In Cardona v. Power, 384 U.S. 672 (1966), the Court found that by force 
of the supremacy clause and section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1973(e) (Supp. III, 1965-1967), the State of New York's English literacy requirement 
cannot be enforced against persons legally literate in Spanish by virtue of successful 
completion of sixth grade in a public school, or in a private school accredited by the 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. 
The Court has condemned voter qualifications which bear no demonstrable relation 
to the promotion of intelligence and responsibility in voting. For instance, in Carring-
ton v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965), it struck down a provision of the Texas constitution 
which prohibited any member of the armed forces who moved to Texas from ever 
\'Oting in that state while still in the armed forces. 380 U.S. at 91-92. In Harper, the 
Court declared the Virginia poll tax unconstitutional saying, "Voter qualifications 
have no relation ••• to paying •.• this or any other tax." 383 U.S. at 666. 
5. The Supreme Court has stressed the basic premise that issues should be decided 
by a majority of the people concerned. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Wesberry 
v. Sanders, 376 U.S. I (1964); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963); Baker v. Carr, 369 
U.S. 186 (1962). As one distinguished observer has concluded, "In all the cases emerges 
the basic proposition that a majority of the human beings concerned ,viii determine 
their political and economic fate." A. SUTHERLAND, CoNSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA 508 
(1965). 
It is apparent that if a person has no concern with the outcome of an election, it is 
not a denial of equal protection to deny him the right to vote. However, it will not 
always be possible to say that a person has no interest whatsoever in the outcome of 
an election. Rather, the line must be drawn on the ground that certain people have a 
substantially greater interest in an issue than others, whose interest may be indirect or 
insubstantial. If this is established, it is not unreasonable or unfair to exclude the 
latter group from voting on a particular issue. For instance, a resident of Ann Arbor 
who commutes fifty miles to Detroit to work is undoubtedly affected by and interested 
in the outcome of the municipal elections in Detroit; however, it is not unconstitutional 
to deny him the right to vote in those elections. The distinction would have to be 
drawn on the basis of the fact that property owners as opposed to those who did not 
own property in Detroit were substantially more interested in the outcome and issues 
of such general elections, and the latter group had no other interests substantial enough 
to entitle them to vote. 
6. See, e.g., Toombs v. Citizens Bank, 281 U.S. 643, 647 (1930); Home Tel. &: Tel. 
Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 211 U.S. 265 (1908). 
7. McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U.S. 539, 547 (1909); cf. Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. 
Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 527 (1959). See also Old Dearborn Distrib. Co. v. Seagram Distillers 
Corp., 299 U.S. 183 (1936); Standard Oil Co. v. City of Marysville, 279 U.S. 582 (1929); 
St. Louis Southwestern Ry. v. Board of Directors, 207 F. 338 (8th Cir. 1913). 
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determination that the property ownership qualification serves as 
a wise fiscal restraint.8 However, it is clear that the legislature 
cannot choose a method that violates the fundamental liberties 
of individuals if the same end can be achieved without infringing 
those liberties.9 In the Cipriano situation, there might well be 
alternative means for promoting fiscal restraint which do not im-
pinge on a number of citizens' right to vote, as the property owner-
ship qualification does. Possible alternatives include such mech-
anisms as manipulation of debt ceilings, state approval of locally 
approved bond issues, or the present requirement of the Louisiana 
statute that final approval of the bond issue be given by the local 
governing body.10 If these alternative means are as reasonable and as 
workable as that of a property ownership requirement, the statutory 
limitation on the right to vote in Cipriano would be unconstitu-
tional.11 
But even assuming that there are no such reasonable and work-
able alternatives, the legislative determination is not necessarily 
conclusive. When the franchise is involved, the normal presumption 
in favor of the legislature is not as strong as it is in other cases. The 
Supreme Court has indicated more than once that "any alleged in-
fringement of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and 
meticulously scrutinized."12 Harper and subsequent voting rights 
cases established that statutorily imposed restrictions on voters run 
afoul of the equal protection clause if they are "irrational," "arbi-
trary," or "invidious"13 or if they are not "reasonable in light of 
8. Principal case at 827-28. 
9. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960); see Note, Constitutional Law-
Police Power-Michigan Statute Requiring Motorcyclists To Wear Protective Helmets 
Held Unconstitutional, 67 MICH. L. REv. 360, 366-67 (1968). This principle is supported 
by the general rule, stated in People v. Armstrong, 73 Mich. 288, 41 N.W. 275 (1889), 
that the state may impose restraints on the individual only to the extent which is 
required or necessary for the protection of public health, safety, or welfare. This seems 
to imply that if a statutory restriction is not necessary or essential-that is if there is 
another method to the same end that does not infringe a fundamental right-the 
restriction is invalid. Note, supra, at 366 n.35. 
10. See note 1 supra. 
11. See, e.g., Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951), in which the 
Court stated that a municipality may not discriminate against interstate commerce, 
even in the exercise of its unquestioned power to protect the health and safety of its 
people, if reasonable nondiscriminary alternatives, adequate to conserve local interests, 
are available. See also Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 163 
CTustice ·Frankfurter, concurring) (emphasis added): 
The precise nature of the interest that has been adversely affected, the manner in 
which this was done, the reasons for doing it, the available alternatives to the 
procedure that was followed • . . the balance of hurt complained of and good 
accomplished-these are some of the considerations that must enter into the judicial 
judgment. 
12. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966) [quoting Reynolds 
v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964)]. 
13. Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 484 (1968) (extending the principle of 
the apportionment cases to local government elections); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of 
Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666, 668 (1966). 
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their purpose."14 Thus, it is clear that state statutes that affect vot-
ing rights will be struck down despite the legislative presumption 
when they make invidious discriminations, are patently arbitrary, 
or are irrelevant to the achievement of the state's objective.15 
Assuming that the courts will take a more active role in assessing 
legislative restrictions on the franchise, the task of determining 
whether voter qualification requirements are irrational, invidious, 
or unreasonable requires a careful evaluation of possible justifica-
tions on the basis of voting competence or interest in the election. 
Obviously, if neither justification appears to be particularly rele-
vant to a given set of circumstances, the restriction is improper.16 
Thus, if the property ownership qualification applied in the prin-
cipal case can be justified realistically on one of these bases, it would 
be constitutional and the Cipriano decision would be correct.17 
One justification for a property ownership qualification on 
voting rights is based on the traditional idea that property owner-
ship is related to voting competence.18 The historical notion was 
that such a requirement would promote the intelligent and re-
sponsible use of the ballot. In colonial times, "property ownership 
and payment of taxes [were] the accepted symbols of community 
membership and interest."19 Professor Galbraith has stated that 
"[i]n the New World, as in the Old, it was assumed that power be-
14. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 93 (1965). 
15. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. 
of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 50·51 (1959). 
16. The court in Cipriano appeared to disagree with this analysis. It noted that the 
standards of voting competence and interest in the result were applicable only in 
general elections and that they did not apply to special elections such as the one in 
question. According to this argument, a voter qualification for a special election would 
not violate the equal protection clause even if it did not meet one of these standards. 
In proposing this principle, the court relied on Sailors v. Board of Educ., 387 U.S. 105 
(1967), in which the scheme for selecting county school board members was challenged. 
In that case, local school boards were elected by popular vote of the residents of the 
district; no constitutional question was raised respecting those elections. The con-
stitutional claim was based on the fact that the county board was chosen not by the 
electors of the county, but by delegates from the local boards, every local school board 
(irrespective of population, wealth, or other differences) having one vote. The Supreme 
Court ruled that this scheme was not inconsistent with equal protection and that 
municipalities could experiment in the selection of members of administrative agencies. 
The court in Cipriano found that the election to approve the issuance of bonds was 
not a general election but concerned only administrative functions of the municipality, 
and relied on the distinction made in Sailors to approve the property ownership 
requirement. However, the Court in Sailors indicated that "where a State provides for 
an election of a local official or agency-whether administrative, legislative, or judicial 
-the requirements of [equal protection] must be met ...• " 387 U.S. at lll. Although 
it did not go on to decide what the requirements of equal protection would be if 
there were to be elections for county school board members, there is no apparent reason 
for the special-election standard to depart from the criteria applied to general elections. 
17. But see notes 9 &: ll supra and accompanying text. 
18. The court in the principal case relied primarily on this justification. Principal 
case at 827. 
19. J. PHILLIPS, MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION IN AMERICA 175 (1960). 
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longed, as a right, to men who owned land. Democracy, in its mod-
ern meaning, began as a system which gave the suffrage to those who 
had proved their worth by acquiring real property and to no 
others."20 
No state today has property qualifications for voting in general 
elections.21 Professor Phillips has described the abandonment of 
such limitations: 
In time [however] leveling influences prevailed, and most Americans 
refused to accept the contention that there was a necessary rela-
tionship between property ownership or payment of taxes and 
interest in government or capacity to govern. North Carolina, in 
1865, was the last state to abolish property ownership as a qualifica-
tion for voting in state and national elections .... 22 
Moreover, even by the end of the 1950's, only a few states re-
quired property ownership for voting on bond issues or special 
assessments.23 The unanimous abandonment of property ownership 
as a prerequisite for voting in general elections and its apparently 
infrequent use as a test for voting in special elections weaken the 
purely historical justification for its present-day use. The same sort 
of historical and traditional justification was rejected by the Supreme 
Court in Harper when it was used in defense of the poll tax. Dis-
senting in that case, Justice Harlan restated the argument: 
It is ... arguable, indeed it was probably accepted as sound political 
theory by a large percentage of Americans through most of our 
history, that people with some property have a deeper stake in 
community affairs, and are consequently more responsible, more 
educated, more knowledgeable, more worthy of confidence, than 
those without means, and that the community and the Nation 
would be better managed if the franchise were restricted to such 
citizens.24 
20. J. GALBRAITH, THE NEW !NDUSfRIAL STATE 52 (1968). 
21. XVII THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 1968-1969, 
30 (1968). 
22. J. PHILLIPS, supra note 19, at 175. 
23. Carville v. McBride, 45 Nev. 305, 202 P. 802 (1922) (state constitution construed 
to permit cities to impose property requirements in local bond elections); LA. CONST, 
art. 14, § 14(a); LA. REv. STAT. §§ 33:4252, 33:4258 (1950) (see note I supra); MICH, 
CoNST. art. 2, § 6 (tax-limit increase or bond issue); MoNT. CONST. art. IX, § 2 [creation 
of levy, debt, or liability; construed to apply only to debts or liabilities to be retired 
by ad valorem taxes in Cottingham v. State Bd. of Examiners, 134 Mont. I, 328 P.2d 
907 (1958)]; NEV. REv. STAT. §§ 387.365-.395 (property owners' veto of approval of sd1ool 
bonds), 539.123 (irrigation district elections) (1967); N.M. CoNsr. art. IX, § IO (county 
elections on borrowing), § 11 (sdtool district elections on borrowing), § 12 (elections to 
increase municipal indebtedness); S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-62(4) (1962) (alternative to 
literacy requirement in all elections); TEX. CONST. art. 7, § 3 (certain sdtool taxes), art. 
9, §§ 4-9, 11 (certain hospital taxes), art. 16, § 59(c) (certain conservation district bonds); 
UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 7 (property ownership requirement permissive in elections to 
create indebtedness or to levy special taxes). 
24. 383 U.S. at 685. 
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Nevertheless, the majority concluded that "[v]oter qualifications 
have no relation to wealth nor to paying ... this or any other tax."25 
Payment of a property tax, or property ownership, when employed 
as a device to promote the "intelligent" use of the ballot, is an 
anachronism. Today, there is no reason to believe that property 
ownership in any way enhances one's ability to exercise intelligent 
judgment in any election. Property owners are not necessarily bet-
ter educated than others, and a literacy requirement would be a 
better device for measuring a potential voter's basic level of edu-
cation or intelligence than would property ownership. Apart from 
considerations of education, there is no reason to believe that 
property owners are per se more responsible or more worthy 
of confidence than nonproperty owners. With increased mobility 
throughout our society-manifested especially by the large num-
ber of property owners employed by national public and private 
enterprises-it is by no means clear that property owners as a 
class have a greater stake in community affairs than those who 
do not own property. 
However, in a case in which the election involves financing by 
increased property taxes, it might be argued that property owners 
would indeed be more likely to vote responsibly than those who 
do not own property. Nevertheless, when it is recognized that 
the property tax is generally not paid by property owners alone, 
but is often passed on to tenants,26 this argument becomes question-
able. 'Without the assumption that property owners alone pay 
the property tax, there is no fundamental difference between prop-
erty owners and nonproperty owners that would make the former 
more likely to vote responsibly in such an election.27 In short, it 
25. 383 U.S. at 666. Whether or not the property tax qualification attacked in the 
principal case (as opposed to property ownership qualifications generally) is ipso facto 
unconstitutional by virtue of Harper is not clear, although such a conclusion is cer-
tainly within a literal reading of the words quoted in the te.'Xt. 
26. When the demand for rental housing is price inelastic, owners of such property 
will raise rents and pass on the increased tax promptly. D. NETZER, EcoNOMICS OF THE 
PROPERTY TAX. 45-46 (1966). This would be the case especially with respect to multi-
family units, owned and maintained for investment purposes; and this is the largest 
share of rental housing by property value. See also C. ADRIAN & C. PRESS, supra note 2, 
at 90: "Contrary to popular misunderstanding, a renter pays just as much in property 
taxes as an owner, although it is hidden in the rent." 
27. There is some suggestion that while there is no economic difference between 
owners and lessees with respect to payment of property taxes, there may be a psychological 
difference. C. ADRIAN & C. PRESS, supra note 2, at 90. It may be true that property owners 
ha\'e a greater awareness of the burden of financing when the property tax is to be 
used to finance the improvement or e."Xpenditure authorized by an election. Neverthe-
less, the distinction is merely one of degree, and its magnitude cannot be demonstrated. 
Moreover, the common practice of landlords of justifying rent increases by virtue of 
increased property taxes weakens the claim that tenants are less aware of the relevant 
is~ues at stake in such an election. It should be noted, however, that the bond issue 
election in Cipriano did not present a case in which the property tax was to be used 
to finance the improvement. Principal case at 824; Judge Wisdom's dissent at 829; LA. 
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is impossible to find any significant connection between the owner-
ship of real property and the ability to exercise the franchise 
intelligently and responsibly.28 Consequently, any property qualifi-
cation such as that in Cipriano seems to be irrational and arbitrary 
with respect to voting competence and the legislative presumption 
in favor of that qualification is thus overcome.29 
The property ownership requirement might still be justified, 
however, if it serves to separate citizens with a substantial interest 
in the outcome of the election from those whose interest is not 
substantial.30 If the outcome of an election affects property own-
ers alone, or if it affects them to a substantially greater degree31 
than it does others, a property ownership qualification would not 
violate the equal protection clause.32 But it is clear that when the 
issue at stake in an election affects all citizens in much the same 
manner and degree, restricting the class of voters to property own-
ers is arbitrary and, therefore, unconstitutional.33 
This type of analysis has been applied recently. In Pierce v. 
Village of Ossining,34 a three-judge federal district court held that 
a restriction of the franchise to "owner[s] of property in the village 
assessed upon the last preceding assessment-role thereof"35 was 
invalid. The issue at stake in the election was whether or not the 
village should change from a mayoral system to a village-manager 
system of government. In holding that this classification of voters 
was arbitrary and had no reasonable relation to proper qualifica-
tions for voting, the court declared: 
The proposition on which plaintiffs have been excluded from 
voting would work a fundamental change in the village govern-
ment where they live. Whether that change should be made affects 
all who live in the Village so that denying the franchise to those 
who do not own real property is an invidious discrimination.36 
CoNsr. art. 14, § 14(m). Consequently, any argument as to the greater responsibility of 
property owners by virtue of their financing of an improvement through the property 
tax, or their greater awareness of such financing, should have no bearing on the 
decision in the principal case. See text accompanying note 4 infra. 
28. For a discussion of property ownership as a qualification on the right to bold 
elective town office and a conclusion that it is impermissible, see Landes v. Town of 
North Hempstead, 20 N.Y.2d 417, 421, 231 N.E.2d 120, 122, 284 N.Y.S.2d 441, 444, 
(1967). But cf. Schweitzer v. Plymouth City Clerk, 381 Mich. 485, 164 N.W.2d 35 (1969). 
29. See notes 13-15 supra and accompanying text. 
30. See note 5 supra. 
31. See notes 43-45 infra and accompanying text. 
32. See note 5 supra. 
33. Id. 
34. 292 F. Supp. 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (unanimous decision by three-judge court), 
35. N.Y. VILLAGE LAw § 4-402(b) (McKinney 1966). 
36. 292 F. Supp. at 115. But see Croen v. Vetrano, 52 Misc. 2d 915, 277 N.Y.S.2d 354 
(Sup. Ct. 1967) (sustaining a restriction on the right to vote in referenda on the question 
of incorporation of a village to owners of real property in the territory involved). 
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Thus, when all residents of a community have equal concern with 
an election issue, the fourteenth amendment demands that they 
have equal voice in the decision. 
Conversely, when there is a substantial difference between the 
interests of various classes of persons and when a reasonable attempt 
is made to identify those classes which have a substantially greater 
interest in a particular election, the vote may be constitutionally 
denied to others.37 In Kramer v. Union Free School District No.15,38 
a resident of the defendant school district-a twenty-eight year 
old bachelor living in the home of his parents-launched a four-
teenth amendment challenge against the provisions of the New 
York Education Law39 which denied him the right to vote in school 
district elections. The statute provided that only residents who 
owned taxable real property, their spouses, lessees in the school 
district (but not their spouses),40 and parents or guardians of chil-
dren attending district schools had the right to vote in such elec-
tions. The majority of the three-judge federal district court found 
the statute valid as a reasonable attempt to limit the vote 
to those district residents who, [the legislature] believes, have a 
direct interest in the administration of the school system because 
they are either real estate taxpayers (or renters of taxable real 
estate) and thus carry the burden of paying for a major share of 
the services provided by the school districts, or because they are 
directly involved as parents of pupils attending the schools in 
question.41 
The interests recognized in the statute as qualifying residents 
to vote are clearly relevant to the issues presented in the election-
electing members to the school board, approval of the budget, and 
levying taxes on taxable real property in the district to meet the 
expenses for the coming year.42 The classes enumerated in the 
statute have direct and substantial interests in those issues in addi-
87. See note 5 supra and accompanying text. 
88. 282 F. Supp. 70 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (2-1 decision), prob. juris. noted, 393 U.S. 
818 (1968) (No. 258). The issue presented on appeal is whether N.Y. EDuc. LAW 
§ 2012 (McKinney 1953) as applied to deny petitioner his right to vote in school district 
elections violates the equal protection clause or the first amendment as made applicable 
to the states by the fourteenth. The first amendment issue was not discussed by the 
lower court. 
39. N.Y. EDUC. I.Aw § 2012 (McKinney 1953). 
40. Since Kramer, the statute has been amended (effective June 16, 1968) to extend 
the vote to the spouse of "one who leases, hires or is in possession of a contract of 
purchase of, real property in such district liable to taxation for school purposes •••. " 
N.Y. EDuc. I.Aw § 2012(3)(a) (McKinney 1969). The constitutionality of the former 
provision extending the vote to spouses of owners of taxable real property while deny-
ing it to spouses of lessees of such property seems doubtful. However, the question was 
not raised in Kramer since the plaintiff had no standing to represent spouses of lessees. 
41. 282 F. Supp. at 73. 
42. N.Y. EDUC. LAW§§ 2021, 2022 (McKinney 1953). 
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tion to the general interest-which is all that could be asserted 
by the plaintiff-in educational policy and in the schools as socio-
cultural institutions. Although it cannot be said that the plaintiff 
was completely unaffected by or disinterested in the issues decided 
by the school district elections, the substantial difference between 
his interests and the interests of those eligible to vote indicates 
that the Kramer decision is a sound one. 
Another type of election in which the right to vote might be 
constitutionally restricted to a certain class of citizens-in this case 
property owners--is a special assessment election on the issue 
of whether to construct public improvements affecting property in a 
specific area.43 Special-assessment financing generally assumes that 
the property adjacent to certain types of public improvements re• 
ceives special benefits from the improvements; therefore, it im-
poses the burden of paying for this kind of improvement upon the 
owners of adjacent parcels of land.44 It might be reasonable to 
restrict the right to vote on whether to construct public projects 
financed in this way to the same group of property owners.40 How-
ever, if people who did not own property-for example, lessees of 
real property that was to be specially assessed-were affected in 
substantially the same way, the property ownership qualification 
could still be held unconstitutional. It might be argued that al-
though lessees do share to some degree in the benefits and bur-
dens, their interests are not nearly so great as those of the property 
owners. Factors which might be said to cause this difference in 
interest are transiency and investment of the property owner in 
the community in terms of the length of his connection with it 
and his direct payment of taxes. However, it is doubtful that 
property ownership is an accurate measure of connection with the 
43. Special assessments for public improvements are special charges imposed by law 
on land to defray the expenses in whole or in part of a local improvement on the theory 
that the owner of the property has received special benefits from the improvement over 
and above the benefits accruing to the community in general. See, e.g., Fluckey v. 
City of Plymouth, 358 Mich. 447, 450, 100 N.W. 2d 486, 489 (1960); County of West-
chester v. Town of Harrison, 201 Misc. 211, 215, 114 N.Y.S.2d 492,497, (Sup. Ct. 1951). 
This is not to say that there are no benefits outside the group whose property is 
assessed, but that this group has benefited specially by the enhancement of their 
property. 
No state statute authorizing such a special-assessment election could be found, such 
assessments normally being made by the local legislative body. See, e.g., l\I. HOWARD, 
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC FINANCE 298-99 (1940); ·w. WINTER, THE SPECIAL ASSESSMENT 
TODAY WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON THE MICHIGAN EXPERIENCE 67-68, 98 (Michigan 
Governmental Studies, No. 26, 1952). Hence, it is posed here as a hypothetical. 
44. See note 43 supra. 
45. Although it is difficult to conceive of a situation in which a municipal improve-
ment in a particular neighborhood would not have some incidental effects on other 
residents or property in the city, merely incidental beneficiaries with a small and 
intangible interest need not be allowed to vote. See note 5 supra and text accompanying 
notes 37-41 supra. 
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community or concern with the special improvement.46 It must 
be reiterated that often lessees effectively pay the property tax.47 
and share the benefits of improvements such as improved sewers, 
wider streets, or community parks; thus, it appears that the inter-
ests of lessees and property owners are likely to be identical. More-
over, it may be unrealistic to expect a state or local legislative body 
to establish adequate guidelines which would take account of all 
possible variations in the comparative interests of the two classes 
of residents. It may be impractical, therefore, to attempt to restrict 
the lessees' franchise so that they can vote only when their interests 
are exactly equivalent to the interests of property owners. Further-
more, such a determination should not be left entirely to the courts 
since the establishment of voter qualifications has traditionally been 
a legislative concern. Thus, it appears that the best course, con-
sistent with both practicality and the equal protection clause, is 
to extend the franchise to lessees and property owners whenever 
the interests of the two groups in the burdens and benefits at stake 
in an election are generally similar. 
Although the three-judge federal district court in Cipriano 
did not consider this standard, the case appears to be wrongly de-
46. Transiency may indeed be relevant in determining the degree of one's interest 
in a public improvement, but the usual method of taking account of this factor is to 
use a residency requirement. It is more direct and does not encompass considerations 
which are irrelevant to the concern; consequently, it should be used if the goal is to 
limit the franchise to those who have a relationship to the community of significant 
duration. 
It might also be argued that one's investment in the community is to be inferred 
from the length of his connection with it, but again residence would appear to be the 
relevant consideration rather than the fact of property ownership. See Shapiro v. 
Thompson, 37 U.S.L.W. 4333 (U.S. April 21, 1969). This case stresses the restriction 
which welfare residence requirements place on the right to_ travel freely within the 
United States, 37 U.S.L.W. at 4336-37. It could be argued that residence requirements 
imposed on the franchise in special assessment elections have a similar effect; however, 
it seems clear that there is a significant difference in the magnitude of the effect. Per-
haps one's participation in civic affairs is more indicative of a concern about the com-
munity than any of the foregoing considerations; but there is no necessary relation 
between such participation and property ownership. 
,vith respect to payment of taxes as a measure of one's investment in the com-
munity, both property owners and lessees pay taxes, including the property tax. See 
note 26 supra and accompanying texL Although there may be some difference in degree 
with respect to the latter, such differences are not easily measured since the lessee's 
payments arc merged in his rcnL Consequently, any distinctions between property owners 
and lessees based on differences in degree of payment of property taxes would be 
administratively impracticable. 
There is a difference in investments in the community in that the tenant's rent 
does not buy a permanent interest in the property. Yet the significance of this differ-
ence for the question of the restriction of the vote in special assessment elections is 
not clear. Public improvements may indeed affect the value of property in either 
direction. ,\'hcthcr property values increase or decrease, the fact that they are affected 
makes it doubtful that property owners arc in the best position to pass exclusive 
judgment on the wisdom or desirability of a public improvement that also affects others. 
47. See note 26 supra. 
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cided when the standard is applied. Property owners have no greater
interest in the bond issue election involved in that case than do
those residents who do not own property in the community. All
residents of the city would benefit in substantially the same way
from the construction of the utility, and because the utility was not
to be financed by property taxes, 48 property owners would bear
no more burden than other residents. Since the burdens and bene-
fits were equal for all, the question was essentially a general one
involving the administration of city affairs. And because property
owners were no more concerned with or affected by the outcome
of the election than were other residents, the property ownership
qualification was clearly inconsistent with the demands of equal
protection and should be invalidated.
48. See note 27 supra.
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